Remarks from Dr. Harry Harding
University Professor of International Affairs,
The George Washington University
Washington D.C., April 18, 2008

How to Think About China

Introduction: changing the subject

The organizers of this conference have asked me to address two questions: Why is it important for American students to know something about China, and how should we understand China’s historical and contemporary significance? These are important questions. But please forgive me for not organizing my remarks around them.

Let me explain why I’m not going to fulfill the assignments I was given. I don’t think it’s really necessary for me to answer the first question. You already know why knowledge of China is important, and you are already committed to conveying that knowledge to your students. And as for the second question, given the level of expertise about China around this room, I wouldn’t be able to say much more than you already know about China’s historical and contemporary significance.

So let me simply remind you of the answers to these two questions.

• Looking back into the past, China is one of the world’s great civilizations, which needs to be understood as part of a general knowledge of world history and as part of one’s liberal education.

• Looking at China today, we see a country that is a virtual laboratory for observing all the challenges and opportunities presented by the modern globalized world. China demonstrates the opportunities to lift millions out of poverty through integration with the international economy, while simultaneously challenging the competitiveness of more advanced societies, including Japan, the EU, and the U.S. China shows what can be achieved by a transition to more market-oriented economy, a more technocratic political system, and a freer society. But it also exemplifies the challenges of inequality, corruption, environmental degradation, communicable diseases, and an aging population.

• Looking forward into the future, China will almost certainly play an even greater role in international affairs, as a major trading nation, an exporter of capital, an investor in both developing countries and advanced societies, and hopefully as a “responsible stakeholder” on a variety of regional and global issues. In so doing, it will continue to present both challenges and opportunities to the rest of the world, and make increasingly the make the study of China a required course, rather than merely an elective, for American students.

So instead of answering these two big questions in any greater detail, let me raise and answer another. Rather than reminding you of why American should study China, or what they should learn when they do, let me say a few words of how they should think about China – and how they should not. This reflects my concern that much of our public discourse about China today is seriously flawed.

1. Avoid black-or-white thinking about China

Historically, American images of China have tended to cycle between two extremes: the extremely positive and the highly negative. This has produced the so-called “love-hate” syndrome described by analysts such as Harold Isaacs in the 1950s and Tu Wei-ming more recently. In some periods, China is viewed in very favorable terms, seen for example as a country ruled by philosopher officials, idealistic revolutionaries, or committed reformers. In other periods, it is seen equally negatively, as rife with corruption, greed, oppression, and violence. Sometimes, the positive and negative views are held by different groups of observers at the same time, each side criticizing the others’ perceptions. And when that happens, as is the case today, one group characterizes the other as “Panda-huggers,” “apologists,” and “appeasers,” while the second describes the first as “China-bashers,” “ideologues,” or “Cold Warriors.” The argument becomes ad hominem, often unpleasantly so.

In fact, the situation China is so complicated that it is not at all conducive to this kind of black-or-white thinking. Anyone who visits China, let alone lives there, understands this complexity all too clearly.

• China has grown extremely rapidly, but the sustainability of its growth – economically, politically, environmentally -- is in doubt.

• Poverty has been significantly reduced, but inequalities have been increased.

• Economic reform has been impressive, but it remains incomplete in several key areas.

• Political reform has lagged economic reform, especially with regard to pluralism and democracy, but other aspects of political reform are by no means absent.

• China is undertaking a more responsible foreign policy, but it does not always follow America’s lead.

• It has integrated itself into the international system, but it wants to play a bigger role and to rewrite some of the rules.

• It is a beneficiary of globalization, but it has also been consistently characterized by various forms of economic nationalism.

Instead of engaging in our customary black-or-white thinking, we should see China in shades of gray, with strengths and weaknesses, positive and negative trends, and accomplishments and shortcomings. We need to understand that no statement about China is likely to be significant and accurate unless it has a “but” or “on the other hand” in it somewhere. And we need to stop portraying China, and those who study it, in highly moralistic terms.

2. Place China in a comparative perspective

We often try to judge China by placing its performance against some kind of yardstick. That’s understandable and appropriate, but it’s important that we choose the most appropriate standard for comparison.

Some observers judge China by comparing it to the ideal type of a perfectly just, equitable, free, and democratic society. That’s a high standard for any country to meet, and it’s not surprising that, by that standard, China falls short. Others try to understand China by comparing it to the United States or Japan, both of which are advanced post-industrial societies. That’s a slightly lower standard, but still difficult for a developing country to match.

I believe it would be more appropriate to compare China with other large developing countries that either achieved independence or began autonomous development after World War II (countries like India, Nigeria, and Brazil) or other post-Communist societies that began economic liberalization and political reform in the late or post-Cold War eras (like Vietnam, Romania, or even Russia). By those standards, China’s path would certainly appear tortuous, experiencing politically-inspired calamities as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Even today, China’s performance would rank far higher on some dimensions than others. But the accomplishments that China has achieved over the last thirty years would be impressive, and the remaining problems would not appear unique.

This problem is exacerbated by the fact that our vocabulary for analyzing economic and political systems like China’s is far more limited than it should be. We have terms that describe democratic systems and authoritarian systems; market economies and planned economies; a free press and a censored press. But we have no sophisticated language to describe anything between those extremes, even though most real-world systems lie there. The best we can do is to describe them as “mixed” systems – hardly a very graphic way of portraying countries that, like China, are characterized by competing tendencies and characteristics. This reinforces our tendency to conclude that, if China is not a democracy, it must be a dictatorship or even a totalitarian system, without considering that it is actually something in between.

3. Avoid the overly confident forecast

Our public discourse about China is filled with confident predictions of China’s future. Some say that China is about to collapse. Others believe that it will inevitably democratize. Others say that it will remain a resilient authoritarian system. Some say that it will become a peer competitor of the United States. Others even believe that there is a “coming conflict” between China and the U.S. Optimists say that the severity of global and regional issues will compel the two countries to become “strategic partners.”

These predictions have all been made with great confidence. But they cannot all be correct, since they present entirely contradictory visions of China’s future.

In fact, we don’t know how China will evolve in the years and decades ahead. This is not because we lack information or insight. It is because China’s future – like that of virtually all human systems – is unknowable. China is simply too complex and chaotic – and I’m using these terms in their technical sense – to be subject to confident prediction. It is characterized by a combination of economic, social, and political features – some of which produce vulnerabilities, others of which produce resilience. Shocks to the Chinese system are conceivable, indeed virtually certain. But the nature, timing, sequencing, and severity of those shocks are simply not knowable. China will be able to ride out some of them, but may fall victim to others. Much will depend on the response of the Chinese government to those shocks: will it make the situation better, or make it worse?

But if China’s future is not knowable, why then do we hear such confident assertions that it is? The answer to this question can be found in one of my favorite books on political forecasting, Expert Political Judgment, written by Berkeley political scientist Philip Tetlock. Tetlock divides analysts into two types: hedgehogs, who hold to one simple view of how the world works and who believe that the future can be easily forecast on the basis of it; and foxes, who draw eclectically on several different frameworks and believe that the future is uncertain. Hedgehogs make the kind of confident predictions I have described above. Foxes, in contrast, present alternative scenarios, specifying the relative probabilities of each and identifying the contingences under which each of them might occur.

Tetlock points out that hedgehogs sound more confident, and their forecasts are less equivocal and less conditional. They are therefore attractive to those of us who want predictability and dislike uncertainty. But the confidence of the hedgehogs is misguided, and their confident predictions are almost always erroneous. It’s the foxes, despite their annoying tendency to present alternative scenarios and to embrace uncertainty, who provide the more valuable insights into the future.

So we need to think more accurately, even if less dramatically, like foxes. We need to understand and acknowledge that China’s future is uncertain, and try to identify the drivers that will determine which course it will take, and the possible inflection points that will let us know when it has shifted direction. Above all, we need to be skeptical about those who claim certainty about where China is going.

4. Understand the breadth of the relationship

Back in the 1980s and 90s, U.S.-China relations centered primarily on three issues – Taiwan, trade, and human rights – with some attention to proliferation as well. But today, the bilateral agenda has expanded to include a far wider range of issues. My undergraduate course on the U.S.-China relationship now also deals with direct investment, portfolio investment, energy, the environment, terrorism and other transnational issues, the military balance, Third World development, regional and global economic organizations, regional security architecture, and global governance. And I stop there only because I run out of time. If there were more weeks in the semester, I could easily include additional sessions on transnational health problems and organized crime, as well as on the American and Chinese views on such specific issues as Korea, Burma, Iran, and Sudan. And virtually all of these issues have to be understood in their broader regional and global contexts.

As a result, the would-be student of U.S.-China relations now has to understand not just the history of the Taiwan issue and the different definitions that Beijing and Washington bring to their discussions of human rights. He or she also has to understand something about international financial flows, the implications of appreciation and depreciation of foreign currencies, the nature of the international energy market, the various approaches to dealing with global warming, the alternative strategies for promoting development, competing views of regional economic architecture, and so forth. So the “specialist” on U.S.-China relations must actually be a generalist, if he or she is to be able to comment knowledgeably and insightfully on the U.S.-China relationship.

This broader agenda poses both challenges and opportunities for our two countries, as well as for the scholars who analyze their relationship. On many of these new issues, the U.S. and China will find that they have significant common interests – interests in maintaining regional stability, promoting global prosperity, preventing climate change, dealing with international terrorism, coping with transborder pandemics of communicable disease, encouraging sustainable development in the third world, and so forth. These common interests may cushion some of our remaining differences over longer-standing issues such as trade, Taiwan, and human rights. On the other hand, we may differ over the best strategies for advancing our common interests, and may also disagree over our respective responsibilities for dealing with international problems.

But the most important implication is that, on an increasing range of issues, China and the U.S. will have to cooperate with each other if they are to achieve their objectives. This will make the U.S.-China relationship even more complex, but it will not necessarily make it more stable or less contentious.

5. Focus on the U.S. as well as on China

I’m fortunate enough to have the opportunity to attend a large number of conferences and meetings on U.S.-China relations, organized by institutions both here and outside the capital. But as fruitful and enjoyable as these meetings usually are, I’ve become increasingly dissatisfied with the narrow analysis of the U.S.-China relationship that they generally provide. The speakers often explain how our bilateral trade imbalance is the result of China’s savings surplus, but they do not devote equal attention to America’s savings deficit. They discuss China’s national energy policy, but not America’s. They talk about the growing interest in the “Beijing Consensus” on Third World development, but not about the “Washington Consensus” to which it is a reaction. They assess China’s policy on climate change, but not America’s. They talk about the rise of nationalistic sentiment in China, but not the rise of protectionism in America. In other words, they analyze half of the U.S.-China relationship: China, but not the U.S.

This impression -- that American analysis of U.S.-China relations is missing a crucial dimension – is reinforced when I attend similar conferences in Asia. One frequent topic of conversation at such meetings is the identification of the major risks to stability in the region in the coming decades. And here there is often a difference between the ways in which Americans and Asians define the issue. Americans often say that one of the biggest risks to the stability of the region is the rise of China. But Asians pose the problem slightly differently, as the uncertainties surrounding the future of U.S.-China relations. So while we usually define the problem exclusively as what China might become. Asians also see the problem as how the U.S. might respond – or even how the U.S. might shape China’s choices.

In what ways do we need to broaden our vision to include not just China, but also the U.S., the region, and global institutions?

• Most of the economic issues in our relationship with China are controversial because of problems in the American economy, not just because of developments in China.

• Our ability to compete with China internationally, in areas such as development models and international norms as well as economics, will be a function of our competitiveness as much as China’s.

• The triggers that could disrupt U.S.-China relations could occur in the U.S. – or in any number of third countries – not just in China.

• Above all, our ability to absorb China into a stable regional and global balance of power, and in economic and security institutions, is a function of the vitality of the balance and the vitality of those institutions, not just of China’s capabilities and intentions.

In short, the U.S.-China relationship centers around two actors, the U.S. and China, with other countries and international organizations playing supporting roles. Focusing our attention on only one of this pair of countries – China – will lead to an incomplete understanding of this crucially important bilateral relationship.

Conclusion

In short, Americans have to think about China in new ways:

• We need a more balanced understanding of China’s present circumstances.

• Such an understanding will be facilitated if we place China in an appropriate comparative setting.

• We need to avoid overly simplistic and excessively confident forecasts of China’s future.

• We need to appreciate the growing breadth of the U.S.-China relationship.

• And we need to understand that the future of that relationship depends as much on the U.S. as on China.

I’m reminded of the classic passage from Sun Tzu’s Art of War: “Know the enemy, know yourself; in a hundred battles, no defeats.” If we don’t have an accurate and balanced understanding of China, and don’t know ourselves and other relevant players, how can we have even one victory – or, in this case, deal with China effectively?